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Ellison's Early Xmas...

Quite the day for the world's second wealthiest software magnate. In what's been a turbulent U.S. equity market, Larry Ellison enjoyed not one, but two financial boons today:

  • Oracle reported stellar Q2 financial results last night after the close; showing the world that, once again, his vision of consolidating the enterprise software industry is working. And those assailing the plan as a means of masking slowing organic growth are having to resort to the New Math in order to keep singing that song at this point. Database and middleware grew 30% in the Q; which is the best number I can recall from the company in at least 10 years [if anyone feels like confirming that as fact, I would greatly appreciate it].
  • And then NetSuite, a company I've discussed quite a bit over the years, listed shares today at $26 per share, significantly above the thrice raised proposed offering range. As if that weren't enough, the stock rallied sharply late in the day to close the day at $35.50. In the process, that puts NetSuite's market capitalization at an astounding $2.1 BILLION.

Assuming the underwriter's exercised the over-allotment today, Ellison (and family + related parties) will beneficially own 65.4% of the outstanding shares; putting their one day paper gain at $1.38 BILLION.

Eggnog_2 'Tis the season and that means giving as well as getting; and so I'm sure Marc Benioff, a former Oracle acolyte, would like to say thanks today, too. You see, the lofty valuation afforded NetSuite today had a halo effect on shares of salesforce.com (CRM); as investors no doubt looked upon the relative size, profitability and cash flow generation of CRM and bid the shares up in sympathy. CRM finished the day at $65 (up 8%) at a new 52-week high.

As a shareholder of both CRM and ORCL, I too will raise a glass of eggnog tonight for the early holiday tidings.

Note: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell CRM, N, ORCL or any other security, but is merely a personal analysis to foster discussion for informational purposes only. At the time of this writing, I and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, did not maintain a position (long or short) in N but did maintain long equity positions in both CRM and ORCL. As always, we reserve the right to alter our investment holdings at any time in the future. We also may, at times, carry derivative options on underlying positions as a hedge.

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Oracle struts its way into FY08...

Oralogo_small When you have a long history following a particular company, sometimes the devil is in the details. In Oracle's case, there are a few rules of thumb to measuring how THEY (meaning Larry, Safra and Chuck) felt about the quarter:

1) How long is the call? -- I've found that when they keep their prepared remarks to a minimum, it usually means they've done quite well and are legitimately confident in the outlook. Lengthier diatribes meant to sway public opinion or spin things generally have the opposite impact.

2) How much does Larry let Chuck and Safra talk? -- The number of times Larry Ellison interrupts his Co-Presidents is inversely proportional to the strength of the results

3) How direct are they? -- The cleaner the Q, the less shucking and jiving goes on during Q&A. Less chatter about secondary and tertiary metrics and more head on talk about the metrics we care about (i.e., revenues, market share, cash flow, earnings per share).

By those measures, Oracle is executing well. The prepared remarks were short, the rhetoric was kept to a minimum (with a few notable exceptions we'll discuss in a moment), and Larry let Safra and Chuck talk uninterrupted in most cases.

You can find the full results HERE, but the headline numbers were:

  • New software licenses -- $2.48 billion (17% growth, 13% constant currency)
    • Applications -- $726mm (13% growth, 10% c.c.)
    • Database and middleware -- $1.76 billion (18% growth, 15% c.c.)
  • Software license updates and support -- $2.27 billion (21%, 17% c.c.)
    • Applications -- $832mm (23%, 19% c.c.)
    • Database and middleware -- $1.44 billion (20%, 17% c.c.)
  • Services -- $1.08 billion (26%, 20% c.c.)
    • Consulting -- $819mm (30% growth, 24% c.c.)
    • On Demand -- $151mm (16% growth, 12% c.c.)
    • Education -- $105mm (10% growth, 6% c.c.)
  • Total revenues -- $5.83 billion (20%, 16% c.c.)
  • Operating margins -- 46% (Non GAAP), 39% (GAAP)
  • EPS -- $0.37 (Non GAAP), $0.31 (GAAP)
  • Operating cash flow (Trailing 4Qs) -- $5.5 billion
  • Free cash flow (Trailing 4Qs) -- $5.2 billion

Applications vs. Database/Middleware
The infrastructure stack was clearly the star this quarter. Overall applications revenues at 13% YOY showed a share deceleration from recent quarters, and were more in line with industry rates than we've seen of late. Backing out the approximate $25mm contribution from Hyperion in the quarter (60% of $43mm), growth was approximately 11.5-12% on an apples to apples basis. Meanwhile database and middleware growth of 18% was the best result this fiscal year and was even more impressive when you consider the tough compare (Oracle dbase/middleware grew 18% last Q4, as well).

Q1 Guidance Sets the Bar High

Q1 guidance was nothing short of aggressive.

  • New software license revenues up 20%-30% YOY [implies $960mm-$1.05B]
  • Total revenues up 19%-21% on a GAAP basis [implies $4.27B-$4.35B]
  • EPS of $0.21 [Non GAAP] vs. $0.18 last year

Although Oracle didn't provide guidance for the full year, it recommitted to "continued operating margin improvement" and reiterated its goal of growing EPS at least 20% per annum. Just reading through the numbers doesn't convey the confidence Larry, Safra and Chuck articulated on the call. As is often the case, the sell-side analysts gave the trio plenty of opportunities to hedge their bets and clearly they were in no mood. Take a look at a sampling of the bravado from the conference call:

Oracle Q4'07 Conference Call Transcript (Seeking Alpha)

Heather Bellini - UBS

Hi. Good afternoon, everybody. I was just wondering, Safra, if you could talk a little bit about the size of the pipeline entering Q1 versus prior Q1 and last year in particular, the guidance is obviously very good. And was also wondering, if you could touch on your thoughts for how we should think about operating margins in fiscal year '08 and what the company is focused on in terms of margins. Thank you.

Safra Catz

Sure Heather, nice way to put three questions in one, but we will go with that. The reality is high pipelines look fantastic frankly for Q1, going into Q1 it will be obviously exciting. It could be our largest Q1 ever, as you can see by our guidance, we feel that we are really going on all cylinders and the forecast is very, very, very significant. So, we feel very good about it. Well, we wouldn't have come up with this kind of guidance, frankly. [note: emphasis is mine]

...So, I think that the reality is the pipelines look extremely good. We took a brush through them and assumed lower closing rates than we usually use, and we still came up with this guidance.

The good news is Oracle left no room for interpretation. The bad news is Oracle left no room for interpretation. They are calling for a record Q1 and citing overflowing pipelines as the driver. When you explicitly say you assumed lower than normal close rates and still came up with record guidance, you leave yourself absolutely no room for a shortfall. Investor reaction to anything short of a meet or beat next Q will be severe, in my opinion.

The M&A Train Continues to Chug Along

Lest anyone worried Oracle was thinking about slowing down its pace of acquisitions, they clearly intend to keep the train chugging along.

Brent Thill - Citigroup

And just a quick follow-up Larry? 30 acquisitions over the last three years, five in just Q4, can you just talk in a very high level in terms of your pace? Do you expect it to slow or continue?

Larry Ellison

I expect that the pace to continue.

On Demand Rhetoric a Chink in the Q4 Armor

What would an Oracle call be without some controversy? In this case, it came when Oracle started talking about the On Demand business. There had been widespread speculation that Oracle would take this opportunity to build spin and momentum about its CRM On Demand business relative to Salesforce.com and other SaaS players. Try as they might, their chatter rang hollow. Consider:

  • Chuck Phillips hailed a "274% increase in website traffic to our CRM On Demand home page." When you have to lead your touts with an undefined increase in PAGE VIEWS, there's not a lot of momentum in the business.
  • They cited 74% growth in CRM On Demand revenues in the Q, and said that "bookings were even stronger." Again, this is misleading because On Demand revenues in their entirety were $151mm, up 12% in constant currency. For CRM On Demand to have enjoyed 74% growth, we're talking about a SMALL number; a rounding error for Oracle AND relative to what SfDC is doing quarterly.
  • Chuck indicated that the user interface isn't going to "drive deals in the enterprise anymore." I wasn't aware that SfDC built a $500mm business based on how pretty its UI was, but if you say so Chuck.
  • According to Phillips, "there are certain laws that speak to data privacy and where the data can reside, how it can be commingled and they are very nervous about that",  and Larry indicated fear of "data privacy issues" was causing problems for "multi-tenant" vendors. Seriously folks? Have we gone back in time five years? There are inevitably going to be companies that are apprehensive about a shared database schema, but there are clearly as many if not more that are absolutely fine with this. And pretending as though security issues aren't addressed by SfDC and other SaaS platforms borders on the ridiculous.

All in all, Oracle has either signaled to everyone that 2008 is starting with momentum across all of its businesses, OR, they are setting themselves up to disappoint the Street in a big way. One of the cruel fates of the perpetual license-based software business is that the revenue bar resets every Q so Oracle better be telling the truth about their assumed close rates and pipeline; there's no margin for error. On the flip side, if they do deliver on their guidance, it's going to be that much harder for the skeptics to ask whether Oracle's industry consolidation strategy was the wrong one.

Related Posts:

Note: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell Oracle or any other security, but is merely a personal analysis to foster discussion for informational purposes only. At the time of this writing, I and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, maintained long equity positions in CRM and MSFT but did not maintain a position (long or short) in ORCL or SAP.

Oracle stays Agile with its M&A strategy...

Agile_software_logo Agile Software (AGIL) has agreed to be acquired by Oracle (ORCL) for $495mm in cash considerations, or $8.10 per Agile share. This is just the latest in an ongoing wave of consolidation moves for Oracle; and frankly this is one of the least surprising deals of the bunch. Agile has been meandering about struggling to generate organic growth for a long time; and has been rumored to be on the block for ages. The fact the company recently completed its internal investigation into options backdating and got current with its filings may have played a role in the timing.

In many ways, this deal helps bring the software world full circle. Agile agreed to sell out to Ariba back in 2001 for $2.6 BILLION [in stock] before the market correction put the kibosh on the deal.

Meandering financials

  • Q3'07 revenues: $33.2mm (1.8% YOY growth)
  • Q3'07 license revenues: $11.5mm (14.2% YOY decline)
  • Q3'07 net income [non GAAP]: $488K or $0.01 per share
  • Nine months of FY07 revenues: $96.7mm (2.0% YOY decline)
  • Nine months of FY07 license revenues: $32.1mm (13.0% YOY decline)
  • Non GAAP EPS: $0.03 vs. ($0.06 loss)

An inexpensive acquisition

Oracle has shown impressive flexibility in the price its paid for the 20+ acquisitions made over the last 3 years. While the Hyperion acquisition came at a healthy premium, todays' deal marks a meager 14.4% premium of today's closing price of $7.08. The $495mm purchase price equates to:

  • 2.3x EV/sales
  • 3.5x EV/services
  • Approximately 5.0x EV/maintenance

At the end of they day, this deal serves dual purposes for the Larry and Company. One, despite lackluster growth Agile is an industry standard for BOM management and product design. This deal is another incremental brick in the walled garden it's building around SAP's partner ecosystem. Two, the multiple paid is such that it won't be hard for Oracle to generate positive EV from the transaction regardless of whether it manages to reinvigorate growth in the segment.

Note: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell AGIL, ORCL or any other security, but is merely a personal analysis to foster discussion for informational purposes only. At the time of this writing, I and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over did not maintain a position (long or short) in AGIL, ORCL or SAP. We also may, at times, carry derivative options on underlying positions as a hedge.

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Where's Judge Wapner when we need him?: Oracle sues SAP

Oracle filed suit against SAP today in the Northern District of California alleging:

Oracle brings this lawsuit after discovering that SAP is engaged in systematic, illegal access to – and taking from – Oracle’s computerized customer support systems. Through this scheme, SAP has stolen thousands of proprietary, copyrighted software products and other confidential materials that Oracle developed to service its own support customers. SAP gained repeated and unauthorized access, in many cases by use of pretextual customer log-in credentials, to Oracle’s proprietary, password-protected customer support website. From that website, SAP has copied and swept thousands of Oracle software products and other proprietary and confidential materials onto its own servers. As a result, SAP has compiled an illegal library of Oracle’s copyrighted software code and other materials. This storehouse of stolen Oracle intellectual property enables SAP to offer cut rate support services to customers who use Oracle software, and to attempt to lure them to SAP’s applications software platform and away from Oracle’s. Through this Complaint, Oracle seeks to stop SAP’s illegal intrusions and theft, to prevent SAP from using the materials it has illegally acquired to compete with Oracle, and to recover damages and attorneys’ fees.

The complaint is surprisingly easy to read and a short [at least for legal filings] 41 pages and offers some very explicit allegations that largely revolve around alleged use of passwords to access and subsequently download large amounts of Oracle customer support and technical documentation. Although the lawsuit extends to SAP proper, most of the complaints appear to revolve around actions allegedly taken by SAP's 3rd-party maintenance subsidiary, TomorrowNow.

I can't and won't begin to comment on how this ultimately plays out; we haven't heard SAP's official response [and we might not as their stated corporate policy is to not comment on pending litigation] and we also have no sense of the magnitude of the requested damages. Not to mention legal affairs are clearly outside my bailiwick.

Wapnersized_2 In any event, you can be sure this will make for some interesting press bites. We know that Ellison has never shied away from public barbs with his competitors, so surely he'll play up the "wounded Oracle" angle for as long as this litigation persists.

The much broader and more interesting question is what impact, if any, this will have on the 3rd party maintenance movement. While TomorrowNow isn't the only game in town (netCustomer, Rimini, SYSTIME to name a few); at the heart of Oracle's complaint is that TomorrowNow wouldn't have been able to successfully woo PeopleSoft and J.D. Edward's customers away for 50% discounts without this ill-gotten information.

When I profiled TomorrowNow after Sapphire last year, I asked...will the ends justify the means? But I never suspected that would be a prescient question that would ultimately be settled in court.

Several Irregulars have chimed in on this story, too.

I would urge you to read Vinnie's brief but articulate take on this matter. Among all my friends and colleagues, he understands the customers' perspective; as he is on the front lines of customer maintenance negotiations every day.

Note: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell Oracle, SAP or any other security, but is merely a personal analysis to foster discussion for informational purposes only. At the time of this writing, I and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, maintained a long equity position in SAP but did not maintain a position (long or short) in ORCL.



Oracle Q3 Results: A Lot to Like...

Oralogo_small Long-time readers know I'm no Oracle apologist. When they've disappointed or, in my view, misled the market I've told you so. But as a sometime Oracle shareholder that's followed the company for more than a decade as an industry analyst, I have to hand it to them for a solid quarter. Perhaps more importantly, this marks the third time in four quarters whereby they've under promised and over delivered (with last Q's disappointment thrown in as ballast).

After the close tonight, Oracle reported solid Q3 results.

You can read the results for yourself, but here are some of the headline numbers:

  • Total Revenues
    • Total revenues = $4.41B [27% YOY]
    • New software license = $1.39B [27% YOY]
    • Software license updates and support = $2.11B [24% YOY]
    • Services = $916mm [36%]
  • Applications
    • New software license = $423mm [57% YOY]
    • Excluding acquisitions [i.e., i-flex, Portal, Metasolv, SPL] = $389mm [44% YOY]
    • Excluding Siebel [which just anniversaried], growth was 32% YOY
  • Database & Middleware
    • New database software license = $967mm [17% YOY]
  • Margins, Balance Sheet & Cash Flow
    • Operating Income
      • GAAP = $1.39B [32% of revenues]
      • Non GAAP = $1.76B [39% of revenues]
    • Net Income
      • GAAP = $1.03B [23% of revenues]
      • Non GAAP = $1.30B [29% of revenues]
    • EPS
      • GAAP = $0.20 [36% YOY growth, benefited by lower tax rate]
      • Non GAAP = $0.25 [31% YOY growth]
    • Deferred Revenues = $3.04B
    • GAAP Operating Cash Flow [Trailing 4 Qs] = $4.98B
    • Free Cash Flow [Trailing 4 Qs] = $4.73B

Key Takeaways

  • So much for mega deals...there were lots of rumors and innuendo floating around that Oracle had closed a series of mega-deals upwards of $50mm-$100mm; which is how they managed to meet expectations. Safra threw cold water on those flames:

Safra Catz: I know there are rumors of mega-deals in the quarter, a couple at over $100 million, and those rumors are simply not true. Even if you added up the top five deals in the quarter, you do not get to $100 million in new license revenue. You add the top 20, you do not get to $200 million.

  • You can't credit acquisitions for masking a lack of organic growth this quarter...as the numbers suggest, applications growth was strong any way you slice the data; and Ellison and Chuck Phillips were more than happy to compare their Q3 and TTM license growth to SAP's:

Larry Ellison: We closed the gap and gained applications market share again this quarter. Oracle's application new license business grew 57% in Q3. SAP grew only 7% in their most recent quarter. 57% growth for Oracle, 7% growth for SAP.

Oracle grew its application new license business on average 61% over the last four quarters. SAP averaged only 10% growth over its last four quarters. So in the trailing 12 months, we are growing six times faster than SAP. SAP is still larger than Oracle in the applications business but we are gaining on them consistently and rapidly.

  • Guidance was conservative, but body language was unmistakably bullish...Oracle's Q4 guidance calls for 5%-15% new license revenue growth; a far cry from the results delivered in Q3. But let's not forget that Oracle delivered a monster Q4-06 and is up against tough comps. While official guidance may be labeled as "conservative" by some, look at the comments from Safra during the Q&A to get a real glimpse at their expectations:

Safra Catz: Obviously pipelines are very big. We had a huge Q4 last year but obviously the pipelines this year are bigger, significantly bigger. We have assumed modestly lower close rates than we had last year, just always trying to be cautious even though the truth was last year’s close rates were not outrageously high or anything like that, or one or the other. The reality is pipelines are very, very big.

But pipelines do not tell the whole story and we are going to have to close just an enormous amount of business. North America alone, rounding around about $1 billion of new license sales just in the 50 states and Canada. That is a lot of new license revenue to sell but we are very, very upbeat. We have the pipeline supported and then some and we have used very reasonably conservative close rates.

  • The pressure is on SAP and BEA to deliver...Both SAP and BEA have to deliver pristine, clean quarters in order to assuage growing concern that Oracle's consolidation strategy is starting to work. SAP, in particular, has a lot to prove as they come off a disappointing Q4 that already saw them reduce expectations for 2007.
  • Oracle Enterprise Linux is off to a slow start...Chuck Phillips tried to paint Oracle's Enterprise Linux in a positive light, but there's little question it's off to a slow start. Yes, they announced Yahoo! as a replacement win versus Red Hat; but Ellison chooses his words carefully and the following quote tells that tale:

Larry Ellison: And Oracle has replaced Red Hat at Yahoo! and numerous other customer sites as their support supplier, Linux support supplier. That's extremely important. And this is just the beginning. We're not going to build the Linux business overnight, but we will build it.

  • More vertical M&A is on the horizon...Oracle has spent a lot of money building out vertical expertise in financial services [i-flex], communications [Portal, Net4Call, HotSip, Metasolv], and retail [Retek, ProfitLogic, 360 Commerce, Demantra] and, most recently utilities [SPL WorldGroup]; and we shouldn't expect this strategy to change anytime soon:

Chuck Phillips: The second -- your second question considering that our existing verticals are doing so well, are we tempted to do more? The answer is, of course, yes.

Finally: Correcting the Inevitable Non-Sequiturs

What would an Oracle conference call be without a few non-sequiturs to dispel? Larry, Safra and Chuck just can't resist even in quarters that should speak for themselves.

  • The irony of organic growth -- Oracle's has been unapologetic about it's aggressive M&A strategy to fuel growth in the apps business; which is why the following pontification from Larry rings so hollow.

[When asked about the key drivers for Oracle's strong middleware growth rate]...

We thought the right strategy was to take all of our middleware components and have a modern integrated suite, all the pieces play together and all of them support industry standards. In terms of a portal, there are industry standards in the portal. BEA went out and bought Plumtree, which was a leading portal supplier but that product did not conform to industry standards. It was not a standards-based product.

We decided to focus on two things: all the pieces fit together, an integrated suite, and industry standards and we think that is playing very well. IBM’s long list of stuff, again, it is not really integrated. A lot of it is standards-based but the pieces do not play together.

Clearly what's good for the goose [middleware] is not good for the gander [apps].

  • The irony of "multiple" product suites -- Oracle has a right to put some pressure on SAP; they are fierce competitors with very different strategies. But how can a company that's currently servicing installed bases for Siebel, Peoplesoft, J.D. Edwards, Retek and it's legacy Oracle ERP products have the audacity to accuse SAP of the following:

Larry Ellison: SAP’s growth strategy is to expand into ERP for smaller, mid-sized companies with their new A1F product. I think that is SAP’s fourth product line. They have the product line that they bought for very, very small companies when they acquired [inaudible] company. They have R3, they have mySAP, and now they have A1F, so SAP’s strategy seems to be to have lots and lots of different ERP systems.

Our strategy, by the way, in contrast is with Fusion to have one ERP system, one suite that will be available on demand, that will be available for small and mid-sized companies all the way to the largest company, so a very different strategy.

That is RICH.

  • On buying "market leaders" -- During the Q&A, Chuck said:

The answer is of course yes, with the explanation that we really tend to buy industry leaders, leading companies. When we bought i-flex, they are the number one company for automating retail, so we like to buy category leaders when we go into this business.

Let's be clear, some Oracle acquisitions have indeed been market leaders, but that has not been an unyielding prerequisite. Was Portal best-in-class? Was Metasolv? Was 360 Commerce?

Concluding Thoughts

Oracle has been put in the penalty box for a long time because it has chosen to fuel growth via acquisitions. All things being equal, there is a legitimate case to be made for organic growth trumping acquired growth. But if you believe the enterprise software market is maturing, Oracle's approach starts to make sense. The critical component toward M&A-driven growth is an ability to generate shareholder value. Many times M&A comes at the expense of current shareholders as it robs us of current and future cash flow. It also usually involves dilution in the form of increased share count, and hurts GAAP results due to amortization of intangibles. While Oracle certainly has to deal with amortization of intangibles, why aren't they being given credit for actually REDUCING share count year over year? How many technology companies can make that claim? How many tech companies, particularly of Oracle's size, are generating free cash flow in excess of net income? And it's not as though Oracle is doing this on razor thin margins; they've got the best margin profile this side of Microsoft.

As long as the cost of capital remains low and we're seeing LBOs each and every day as private equity firms take advantage of this situation, maybe we should be asking ourselves why more technology bellwethers aren't using leverage to fuel growth versus penalizing Oracle for it.

Related Posts:

Note: This is not a recommendation to buy or sell Oracle or any other security, but is merely a personal analysis to foster discussion for informational purposes only. At the time of this writing, I and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, maintained long equity positions in MSFT, SAP and YHOO but did not maintain a position (long or short) in BEAS, IBM, ORCL or RHT.

 

I've really seen it all now...

I thought I had really and truly heard everything when this story made it's way into my Inbox:

But then I realized that, in fact, I hadn't really seen everything:

What's next?

Oracle underwhelms...

Oralogo_small_3 Oracle reported Q2-07 results after the close today and I found them summarily underwhelming. Judging by the recent price action and the after market trading, I apparently am not alone.

The headline results were good enough in that they were within company guidance [all figures GAAP unless otherwise noted]:

  • Total revenues = $4.16B [up 26% YOY]
  • Total software revenues = $3.27B [up 23% YOY]
  • Software updates and support revenues = $2.01B [up 29% YOY]
  • New software license revenues = $1.21B [14% YOY]
  • Services revenues = $949mm [41% YOY]
  • Operating income = $1.36B
    • Operating margin = 32.6%
  • EPS [GAAP] = $0.18, EPS [Non GAAP] = $0.22

As always, the devil is in the details and that's where the "underwhelming" descriptor comes into play:

  • New software license growth weakens against an easy comparison
    • New software license revenues of $1.21B grew just 14% [including 4% positive impact from currency]
    • That's a major deceleration from the last two quarters [32% and 28%]
    • It's coming off Oracle's weakest Q last year [Q2-06 growth was a meager 9% YOY]
  • Application license revenue was light of expectations
    • Apps revenue of $340mm grew just 28% YOY compared with Q1 (80% YOY growth)
    • Growth slowed despite Q2 being the easiest compare (Oracle apps revenue only grew 24% in Q2-06, but grew 77% or better in each of the other three quarters)
    • Excluding Siebel, i-Flex and Portal, apps revenue was $268mm; just 1% YOY growth (and certainly down YOY on a constant currency basis)
  • Database license revenue fell back to single digits
    • Database license revenues of $867mm represented 9% YOY growth despite coming off a 5% compare last Q2
    • This reverses a two quarter trend of double-digit database growth
  • Services revenue growth rate the highest in recent memory
    • 41% YOY growth in services revenue is the fourth consecutive quarter of accelerating YOY growth

On an Oracle call, it's not just about what you hear, but about what you don't hear...

  1. In an age of web-based transcripts, a lot of investors no longer listen to live conference calls. That can be a mistake because you lose context. In my view, Larry, Safra and Chuck were clearly less enthusiastic than in recent quarters. Their tone, brevity and level of detail were all markedly lower than in the last two conference calls.
  2. Unbreakable Linux already broken? ...Oracle spent more time talking about Secure Enterprise Search, a product announced in March, than it did Unbreakable Linux, the much ballyhooed Red Hat killer.
  3. Oracle spent a lot of time detailing its success in the retail vertical versus SAP...specifically, Ellison noted:
  4. But we are actually in a situation now where 8 out of 10 of the largest retailers in North America now use Oracle retail applications, where only one uses SAP, and that one is now also using Oracle retail software.

    While that's an impressive data point, it's not a new one. According to Oracle's own website, 8 of the top-10 North American retailers were using Oracle Apps dating back to a Stratascope Report in 2005!

     

Let's not forget that Oracle's M&A strategy isn't just about gaining market share. All that aside, it's important to understand what Oracle is trying to accomplish. In recent quarters, as Oracle's stock had enjoyed a resurgence, it seems the market has forgotten the method behind Oracle's M&A madness. It's become de rigeur to think Oracle's acquisition strategy is all about fueling market share growth to keep up with SAP. While that's absolutely part of the equation, there are other reasons driving Oracle's strategy including:

  1. Larry Ellison's belief in the maturation of the software industry -- Ellison was one of the first software industry veterans to acknowledge the maturation of the enterprise software market.
  2. The value of maintenance revenue streams -- For a long time, license revenues were the key driver of investor sentiment and, coincidentally, multiple growth. But as the industry has matured, the importance of maintenance revenue streams have become more widely recognized and respected. Maintenance revenues are predictable (annual renewals), unbelievably high margin (15%-22% of the initial license fees, without the expense of the initial sale), and sustainable (even mediocre software vendors can sustain 80%+ annual maintenance renewals for years after their license revenue growth ebbs.
  3. The financial disconnect between software company valuations and present value of future cash flows -- There's a reason LBO firms are buying up software companies at a far faster pace than ever before. They, like Oracle, believe that many companies in the industry are fundamentally misspriced. In most of Oracle's acquisitions, it hopes/believes it's getting strategic value, but at a minimum it's pricing the deals in such a way that financially it makes a lot of sense. Paying 4x-6x EV/maintenance revenues is hardly financially onerous, or risky as long as Oracle is confident in the sustainability of customer renewal rates.

While the fundamental momentum Oracle showed in the last few quarters appears to have ebbed, the financial momentum continues at an impressive rate. Trailing 12-month free cash flow growth grew at a 32% clip (for the 2nd consecutive quarter); after running at a meager 4% clip this time last year. Free cash flow continues to run above net income, as well.

Oracle has plenty left to prove in the second half of fiscal 2007, but let's not pretend that Oracle's financial future is predicated primarily on organic revenue growth. For better or worse, Larry, Safra and Chuck are thinking differently.

Note: At the time of this writing I, and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, maintained a long equity position in SAP but did not maintain a position (long or short) in BEAS, IBM, ORCL or RHT. We also may, at times, carry derivative options on underlying positions as a hedge.

NetSuite: Oracle's next meal or the Street's next SaaS darling?

Netsuite_5Phil Wainewright today asks whether NetSuite will become part of  Oracle's M&A rampage or whether Larry (NetSuite's largest shareholder) will instead allow the company to come public, as many have expected.

Phil isn't alone in asking the question. I've asked it several times in the last few years. But the one thing neither Phil nor others [myself included] have considered is whether or not Evan Goldberg, Zach Nelson and the other NetSuite stakeholders have provisions against an Oracle takeover. While Ellison has a majority equity stake, that doesn't preclude the other founders from having some type of provision within the partnership documents that gives them leverage in any negotiations with Oracle.

Given the importance of SaaS and Oracle's willingness to embrace the maturation of the traditional perpetual license model; I can't see how NetSuite would be allowed to come public UNLESS there are provisions in place that preclude Ellison from forcing the issue.

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Note: At the time of this writing I, and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, did not maintain a position, long or short, in ORCL.

Workday: OK, you've had your day, now get back to work

Sound the trumpets, roll out the carpets, let the coronation begin!

Workday Yes, the long-awaited, much anticipated launch of Dave Duffield and Aneel Bhusri's new venture, Workday, has finally come to pass.  Yesterday I, along with presumably a trillion other analysts and media types, attended the Workday launch briefing. The one-hour webcast gave us plenty of tidbits to chew on but left me with far more questions than answers. I'm looking forward to the chance to sit down with some of my fellow Enterprise Irregulars for a more pointed briefing in the coming weeks now that Workday is officially out of stealth mode.

What we learned yesterday...

The Basics -- Workday is being funded primarily by Duffield himself along with an investment from venerable Greylock (where co-founder Bhusri has hung his hat as General Partner since leaving Peoplesoft).  The company is located in Walnut Creek and currently has 65 employees. The management team, unsurprisingly, is a who's who of key players from Peoplesoft's early days:

  • Dave Duffield, CEO and Chief Customer Advocate
  • Aneel Bhusri, Co-Founder
  • Stan Swete, VP Products & Technology
  • Mike Duffield, VP Sales
  • Ken Morris, VP Chief Technology Strategist

The Offering -- When asked if Workday was the "reincarnation of Peoplesoft", Duffield said "Yes and No."  In many ways, Workday is Peoplesoft Redux; or what Peoplesoft would have looked like if it was started in today's age of SaaS, web services and Web 2.0 UI technologies.  Duffield has embraced the SaaS meme wholeheartedly and is quick to point out that Workday isn't selling software, it's selling Enterprise Business Services:

  • Hosted, on-demand
  • Single instance, multi-tenant
  • Subscription-pricing
  • Browser-based
  • Metadata driven

The Target Market -- Workday may look like Peoplesoft Redux in many ways, but it's initial customer focus looks more like J.D. Edwards Redux.  Workday plans to target 1,000-5,000 employee organizations with $200mm-$1B in revenues (it's calling it the upper middle market).  It was clear that Workday intends to steer clear of SAP and Oracle for as long as it can; even suggesting at one point that by the time Workday is ready to go head-to-head, SaaS pioneers like salesforce.com and RightNow might have paved the way for deploying SaaS across a large enterprise.

Functional Areas
 -- Right now, Workday has only one silo of functionality available, Human Capital Management, but has targeted four core areas over the next year:

The Testimonials -- Workday announced five customers yesterday, and Biosite and Kana Software gave brief accounts of their early experiences.     

  • Mike Fields, the CEO of Kana (and former Oracle executive), is replacing a paper-based legacy system. The implementation started a few weeks ago and they're now live for self-service among Kana employees. Fields cited the lower TCO and the adaptability of the Workday architecture as critical selling points.
  • Suzanne Zoumaras, Chief HR Officer of Biosite, spoke about Workday replacing an "existing HR system that was an impediment to [their] business." Cited scalability, flexibility, the need for a global system, and the desire for a hosted system that could be managed internally as key issues. Biosite is already live on the service offering and processed its first payroll through the service this week. The most compelling part of Zourmaras' story was the ease of implementation.
    • Accordingly, Zoumaras said Biosite went live in four months using three FTEs from HR with "very little" input from the IS team. IS spent "no time" in the implementation.

The Demo -- The demo was, in some ways, underwhelming in my estimation. To be fair, we were seeing a just released 1.0 version so I don't want to pretend like what we saw is what Workday will look like in a year's time. However, I think the demo could have been much stronger in both its structure and focus. As I told Dan Farber:

I would've liked to see less focus on the buzz jargon that dominates the software industry today and more on how the Workday service offering will fundamentally reshape the way workers live their daily lives. Based on the demo, does it really look like something every individual employee is going to a) feel comfortable using and b) be allowed to use? It's cool that someone can go in and do a reorg of their organization, but why would any $500M-$1B company allow that beyond mid-management level? I would've liked to see more of the demo focus on what Joe Employee's processes are like and how Workday improves them, versus the demo we saw which was in the role of a COO reorganizing his workforce; something not unlike what he would be tasked with in current conventional HR ERP modalities. 

Other observations worth pondering...

  • What might have been...Has anyone thought about what might have been had Duffield not lost the battle for Peoplesoft two years ago?  Would he have found the SaaS religion we heard so convincingly yesterday if he still had a massive Peoplesoft and J.D. Edwards legacy installed base to support?
  • Cape Clear's ESB is a critical component to the offering...Workday has embedded Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) technology from Cape Clear. The enterprise services bus is critical for integration and re-use of the web services that drive the Workday solution set. According to the company's website, customers will have the option of managing the ESB internally or having Workday host. 
  • While Cape Clear is a best-in-class ESB, don't think for a second that Workday looked seriously at an alternative ESB...Make no mistake, Cape Clear has the reputation for being as good, if not better than, any other stand alone ESB product on the market. So while it's perfectly rational for Workday to chose Cape Clear in a bake off, I must admit that I find some of the posturing disingenuous. Take a look at this quote from the press release on Cape Clear's website:

“We chose Cape Clear’s ESB Platform for two reasons: they are the recognized market leader, and they are considered the industry's visionary experts,” said Stan Swete, vice president of products and technology for Workday. “With the help of Cape Clear, we’ve been able to deliver an innovative integration layer that supports flexibility and usability – both for us and for our customers – better than any other enterprise system today.”

Hmmm...so the fact that Cape Clear is another of Bhusri's Greylock portfolio companies (where he currently serves as Chairman) didn't play a role in the decision?

  • Aneel's Rolodex having profound influence in the early going...for all the obsession with Dave's return to the market (re-read Vinnie's post if you need a refresher on the cult of Dave), yesterday's press conference had Aneel's fingerprints all over it.
  • CIO mandate can, and will, be an issue...Duffield was asked whether CIOs would be an impediment to Workday's success and he candidly answered that some, in fact, will be while others will be more forward thinking and accept the eventuality that SaaS is the software delivery model of the future. Aneel added that CIO mandate will probably be a larger issue in a year or two when Workday is targeting Fortune 500 accounts. We know that sales executives can mandate the use of salesforce.com, but can an HR executive do the same? Do they have the juice? Will any major company consider ripping out and replacing its battle-tested financial apps for an on-demand alternative?
  • Accenture has already committed to building a dedicated team around Workday...if you needed further evidence that Workday isn't just another SaaS startup, look no further than the fact Accenture is already training a team on the Workday solution.  Getting the big SIs to build a practice around a software offering is something that typically takes years and massive traction within the enterprise; a great many SaaS companies would kill to have Accenture's attention in the way Workday already appears to. This lends credence to Phil Wainewright's position that Accenture is taking serious notice of SaaS opportunities.
  • More flesh on the bone of "definitional services"...Bruce Richardson of AMR has an interview with Workday's two chief software architects that speaks to the revolutionary nature of what they're trying to accomplish. It's a shame that much of the detail found in Bruce's interview wasn't more of a focus in yesterday's launch. 
  • Who is Workday really competing against?...I generally find Q&A sessions on webcasts to be frustrating, because the questions are generally too predictable and lacking in any meaningful depth. Predictably, Workday was asked about competing against SAP and Oracle yesterday but wasn't pressed on the REAL competitive landscape.  While Workday has aspirations of replacing SAP and Oracle in big accounts down the road, they are years away. Let's not forget that Benioff and salesforce.com are still trying to make hay in large enterprises after seven years of trying. Workday is much more battling vendors like NetSuite, SuccessFactors and ADP (which curiously is also a partner). I'm looking forward to Jason Corsello's take on what the other HR-focused SaaS vendors are offering in comparison to what we saw of Workday's HCM solution yesterday. 

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Note: At the time of this writing I, and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, maintained long equity positions in CRM, MSFT and SAP but did not maintain a position (long or short) in ORCL, RNOW, BSTE, KANA or Accenture. We also may, at times, carry derivative options on underlying positions as a hedge. Also, by way of full disclosure, we have a passive investment interest in Granite Global Ventures (we are an LP), which is an investor in SuccessFactors.

Oracle finds CONTENT-ment with Stellent acquisition

Oralogo_small_2 These are Halcyon days for Larry Ellison.  Not only is his stock enjoying a Renaissance (5-year highs) but there is arguably no software executive who loves to see himself and his company in print more than Larry does.  Having seemingly given Chuck and Safra and unending green light, it seems we can't go more than a few weeks without reading about another Oracle acquisition.

What's been fascinating about this unprecedented M&A binge has been the diversity of purchase...

Regardless of what anyone thinks about the long-term viability of this strategy, it's difficult to argue that Larry and his right hand man (and woman) have not accomplished their stated goals thus far.  Clearly, Oracle is using the maturity of the industry to pay reasonable prices for most of these assets.  Putting aside the potential strategic value of any given acquisition, they've used discipline in terms of the financial returns they can generate from the reliable maintenance revenue streams each deal brings with it. On the strategic front, the sum total of these purchases means the Oracle bag carriers have an unending supply of things to pitch CIOs and other IT purchasing agents.

Stellent Tonight, Oracle jumped into the M&A fray again with the announced $440m cash acquisition of content management vendor Stellent (STEL).  Oracle had a gaping hole in the ECM (enterprise content management) space and Stellent was one of the more viable remaining plays there.  With 4,500+ customers and $130mm in TTM revenues, Stellent was running neck and neck with Interwoven (IWOV), Vignette (VIGN) and Open Text (OTEX) in the segment.  Industry leaders Documentum and FileNET had already been swallowed up by EMC and IBM, respectively.

What are Stellent's relative strengths?

  • Excellent customer base
  • Breadth of core ECM functionality (i.e, it can legitimately check off most boxes in an RFP)
  • Strong focus on Sarbox and compliance processes

How much did Oracle pay?

  • At $440mm ($13.50 per STEL share), that implies an enterprise value of $370mm approximately
  • At Stellent's current run rate ($130mm), that equates to 2.8x EV/sales
  • On a P/E basis, that implies 29x and 20x CY06 and CY07 estimates, respectively

Oracle has long been rumored to be in the market for an ECM player, as it was an obvious area of white space in its stack approach.  The interesting question will be what this means for the remaining independent vendors (VIGN, IWOV, OTEX) as well as some of the smaller private content management vendors.  Will HP jump into the fray?  Would SAP consider this an important market to have in-house functionality? Time will tell.

Note: At the time of this writing I, and/or funds I maintain discretionary control over, maintained long equity positions in SAP but did not maintain a position (long or short) in EMC, IBM, ORCL, OTEX, IWOV, VIGN or STEL. We also may, at times, carry derivative options on underlying positions as a hedge.