The Ponderings of Woodrow

What comes to mind and doesn't leave before I have time to write about it...

TechCrunch focuses on lipstick as the guillotine falls...

At this point, not much surprises me. But just when I need a reminder of how out of touch some folks can be from the "big picture" that surrounds them, I get this post from Erick Schonfeld at TechCrunch:

Google Employees Watch In Horror As 60 Percent of Their Stock Options Drown

I'll let you read the entire article but the gist of it is that, as Google shares fall below the $329.78 level, a significant tranche of employee options fall under water. The article goes on to point out that, at current prices, 61% of Google's stock options are under water. And here's where it gets absurd:

Only eight days ago Google’s shares were trading at $411 and three months ago they were above $450. In that time, a lot of paper wealth has disappeared and along with it incentive for many recent hires to stay. Of course, the stock could rally and everything will be honky dory again, but if Google’s market cap is being fundamentally reset along with the rest of the stock market, it could face some serious retention issues in the coming months. The free food and transportation are great perks and all, but let’s get real here. Without the financial upside those stock options represent, Google employees will start looking elsewhere.

Guillotine_4 Looking elsewhere? Good luck to them. I'm sure there will be opportunities for enterprise entrepreneurs who are willing to forgo near term security for the potential of future wealth. But for the vast majority of Google employees, it's ASININE for them to be lamenting their stock options. Does it suck to see your optionality go down the tubes? Of course. But worrying about that right now is like Marie Antoinette making sure her face was properly powdered and lipsticked as the guillotine was falling.

What most Google employees should be thinking right now is...

  • Wow, I'm damn lucky to have a job with a salary and benefits right now
  • I sure hope I've added enough value to keep my job because a lot of smart people are looking for work
  • My company has tons of cash, a dominant market position and relative stability, I'm luckier than 90% of those I know

Seriously folks. If you're working for a technology bellwether like Google, Microsoft, Apple, Research in Motion, IBM, etc...and you're feeling bummed out that your stock options are kaput; that's fine. But if you're still so much in the clouds as to what's transpiring that you're thinking, "I'm going to leave and go to a place where I can get richer, faster" then I don't have much sympathy for you. Get a grip on reality. Seriously.

Disclaimer: At the time of writing, the author and/or the firms affiliated with the author maintained a long equity position in Google [GOOG] and Microsoft [MSFT]. The author and the firm reserve the right to alter their investment positions at any time in the future. The content on this site is provided as general information only and should not be taken as investment advice. Content should not serve in any way as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument, or to participate in any particular trading or investment strategy. The ideas expressed on this site are solely the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the opinions of firms affiliated with the author. Any action taken as a result of information or analysis on this blog is ultimately your responsibility. Consult your investment adviser before making any investment decisions.

October 10, 2008 in Google, Splurge, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)

The Necessity of Blame

The search for someone to blame is always successful -- Robert Half

Blame Game for Financial Crisis

Blamegame_2
Created using http://wordle.net/. Images of Wordles are licensed Creative Commons License.

Blame is EASY. Especially in a situation as grave as our nation is facing right now. I say this because I'm overwhelmed by the pervasiveness of blame in the process. Congressional hearings where the only bipartisan action is finding someone, other than Congress, to blame for our financial crisis. Investment banks crying afoul of short-sellers. Homeowners blaming predatory lenders for making it too easy to overextend themselves. People decrying future tax burdens because their neighbors took out huge mortgages with low teaser rates. Debt holders blaming the ratings agencies for rating things AAA when they were Toxic FFF. And so on and so on...

BUT IS THERE A POINT? Is BLAME productive?

When I was in college, I was involved in a car accident. I was in the back seat of my friend's beaten down clunker; and we were driving on the shoulder with our hazards on trying to get off the turnpike and find a hotel for the night since there were no mechanics open at that hour. It was a cloudy, rainy night and unbeknownst to us there was an 18-wheeler coming up behind us. The driver of that 18-wheeler was dozing off. Long story short, the 18-wheeler slammed into the back of the car and I woke up in an ambulance, unsure of what happened. I learned during that process the concept of COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. Essentially the courts try to determine who to blame, and assign a percentage of blame to each participant. I was apparently 10% to blame; for failing to have a seatbelt on [despite it being legal since I was in the back seat]. The truck driver was 60% to blame; apparently falling asleep at the wheel and slamming into another vehicle works that way. And my buddy, the driver, picked up the rest of the blame for being on the road in a broken down car rather than stopping and awaiting emergency service. The courts used the percentages to determine the amount of damages awarded to the injured parties.

While comparative negligence may work for disability tort litigation, it has absolutely no place in stemming the tide of this financial crisis.
If we're really on the precipice, as the Treasury Secretary, Fed Chairman and even the Oracle of Omaha believe, isn't assigning blame right now a suboptimal way of spending our time?

Howard Lindzon said, "I am not a fan of witchhunts, but they generally get shit done." His point is well taken, even if I wish it weren't.

Sometimes there are legitimate reasons for assigning blame, for figuring out WHOSE FAULT IT IS. But there will be time for that later. Our country is facing the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression and there are no easy answers. Paulson and Bernanke haven't done a credible job of articulating the losers in this crisis. Yes, Wall Street stands to lose jobs and a lot of wealth. But Main Street stands to lose much more. The inability for small businesses to stock shelves and make payroll because lines of credit are drying up. The inability to refinance mortgages. Students unable to pay for tuition because student loan programs have evaporated. Retirees unable to pay their bills because their portfolios are pressured. We are already in recession territory, how many of us truly understand what it would mean to be in a Depression? Are we really prepared for double digit unemployment? Unfunded pensions? Municipal bankruptcies? Further devaluation of our currency? Reflation?

If not, we all need to get past our personal biases, our anger, and our desire for a pound of flesh. Can we do it? Or will we worry about making sure those most culpable aren't disproportionately benefited by a bail out effort? You decide.

Disclaimer: The content on this site is provided as general information only and should not be taken as investment advice. Content should not serve in any way as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument, or to participate in any particular trading or investment strategy. The ideas expressed on this site are solely the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the opinions of firms affiliated with the author. Any action taken as a result of information or analysis on this blog is ultimately your responsibility. Consult your investment adviser before making any investment decisions. 

September 25, 2008 in Bail Out, Finance, Investing, Necessity of Blame, Splurge | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack (0)

Can Buffett do what Paulson and Bernanke couldn't?

It's hard not to appreciate the symmetry of today's events.

Less than a week ago, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke met with Congressional leaders and painted such a bleak picture of our financial system that they compelled the legislators into action, signaling initial support for a $700 blank check mechanism meant to overpower all the fear, uncertainty and doubt freezing up the liquidity of our capital markets. For good measure, SEC Chairman Cox piled on an ill conceived ban on select short sales.

The impact on the equity markets was short-lived, to say the least, as was the pledge of bipartisan support for getting something done in a timely fashion. As we braced for today's hearings, the equity markets staged a powerful sell off yesterday and many began to question the Paulson plan from seemingly every angle.

Having watched much of the hearings today, I was absolutely stunned at how unconvincing Paulson and Bernanke were in conveying their message of financial Armageddon to the Congressional committee. Let's hearken back to comments made by Senators Dodds and Schumer following last week's late night emergency session:

Congressional Leaders Stunned by Warnings [NY Times]

“When you listened to him describe it you gulped," said Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York.

As Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut and chairman of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, put it Friday morning on the ABC program “Good Morning America,” the congressional leaders were told “that we’re literally maybe days away from a complete meltdown of our financial system, with all the implications here at home and globally.”

Mr. Schumer added, “History was sort of hanging over it, like this was a moment.”

When Mr. Schumer described the meeting as “somber,” Mr. Dodd cut in. “Somber doesn’t begin to justify the words,” he said. “We have never heard language like this.”

For those of you who listened to the hearings today, you heard those very same Senators (and their fellow committee members) paint a decidedly different picture. Where was the sense of urgency? Where was the "something must be done right now, and it's not about partisan politics" mantra?

More importantly, where was the eloquent, descriptive state of the financial union that so many of us expected to hear from Paulson and Bernanke today?

Today, Bernanke and Paulson HAD to be better than they were. Realistically, these men were asking for a $700 billion bail out package with a broad, sweeping expansion of their powers and had, to date, offered up a 3-page (or 6-page in the revised version) memorandum in defense of the maneuver. They needed to scare the American people with the severity of the realities facing them.

They had to know that the American people had spoken loud and clear to their elected officials in the preceding days. "Main Street" just wasn't seeing how the Paulson Plan helped them. And in an election year, particularly September of said election year, if you can't get "Main Street" to see the validity of the proposal you have ABSOLUTELY NO HOPE of getting Congress to sign on the dotted line. But didn't Bernanke and Paulson know that before sitting down to testify today?

I assumed they did. Which means either they a) simply failed on the grandest of public stages to convey the actual severity of the situation or b) made a calculated bet against coming across as the heavies to the American people; knowing that a significantly reduced version of the bail out plan was a best case scenario to begin with.

The Markets Didn't Seem to Put Much Faith in the Paulson Plan

The U.S. indices finished at the lows of the day today, following a dramatic sell off on Monday; signaling to many that investors simply weren't putting much credence in the state of the Paulson Plan to stem the bleeding in a timely and optimal manner.

Sept23chart

Enter the Berkshire Call Option: Buffett Announces Investment in Goldman Sachs

Berkshire Hathaway has agreed to invest in Goldman Sachs, Buffett's first investment in a Wall Street firm since his much ballyhooed involvement with Salomon Brothers in the early 90s. The terms of today's agreement:

  • Berkshire will invest $5B in exchange for perpetual preferred stock that pays a 10% annual dividend
  • Berkshire will receive rights to purchase an additional $5B in common stock at $115 per share, exercisable for the next 5 years
  • Goldman will raise an additional $2.5B in common stock through a secondary [it's first equity issuance since 2000]
  • Goldman can call in the preferred stock at any time for a 10% premium

The Perceived Value of Buffett's Endorsement

As I type this, shares of GS are trading at $134.75 [up 7.9% after hours]; signaling the market's enthusiasm for Buffett's investment. Broadly, equity futures are up on this news. There are plenty of rational reasons for the market's enthusiasm tonight:

  • Buffett is, without question, one of the best investors walking the Earth
  • He's heretofore avoided stepping into the Wall Street malaise; his willingness now will be perceived as a signal of bottoming
  • A lot of investors are more than happy to follow Buffett's lead
  • This move puts Goldman on sounder financial footing and signals that the government's moves last week to stem the fire sale are working
  • We're collectively (and justifiably) more impressed by the actions of a private free market participant than we are by the bazooka of forced socialism

But Let's Not Confuse Buffett's Investment in Goldman with What the Paulson Plan is Trying to Solve

The market is beaten up. Conviction is low. Volatility is (relatively) high. Buffett will make people feel better. Whether it's a temporary tonic or the siphon that gets the investment pump churning again very much remains to be seen. But I remain skeptical of this move as a harbinger of a broader fix for several reasons.

  • This is a move to invest in a storied financial entity, Buffett's investment does NOTHING to help set a fair market price for the toxic assets the Treasury is trying to get $700B to acquire
  • Buffett is just the latest investor willing to invest in a Wall Street firm under attractive terms; he's not blazing the trail here. For example, it was announced just a day ago that Mitsubishi UFJ is buying 20% of Morgan Stanley
  • Buffett is getting extremely attractive terms; Goldman didn't provide Buffett with a $500mm annual dividend in perpetuity plus call options for 7% of the company's equity because it had offers pouring in. Few firms will be able to ask for, and get, those kinds of terms

It's not about this investment, it's about whether Buffett can convince the market of reasonable marks for all the toxic assets in the system. The market is tired and frustrated. A lot of people have been looking for "the sign" of a bottom in the financial sector and whether this helps spark the private sector to put money to work remains to be seen. One would hope that Buffett's willingness to get involved will also signal his willingness to actively vocalize thoughts on the appropriate way to value and dispose of the toxic assets which plague the system. If he can convince private buyers to start taking troubled assets off the banks' balance sheets, he may actually accomplish more with $5B than Paulson and Bernanke can with $700B. A scary thought to be sure, but one that's not out of the realm of possibility.

Disclaimer: At the time of writing, neither the author nor the firms affiliated with the author maintained an position, long or short, in the publicly traded companies mentioned or any related instruments. The author and the firm reserve the right to alter their investment positions at any time in the future. The content on this site is provided as general information only and should not be taken as investment advice. Content should not serve in any way as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument, or to participate in any particular trading or investment strategy. The ideas expressed on this site are solely the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the opinions of firms affiliated with the author. Any action taken as a result of information or analysis on this blog is ultimately your responsibility. Consult your investment adviser before making any investment decisions.

September 23, 2008 in Bail Out, Finance, Goldman Sachs, Investing, Splurge, Warren Buffett | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Hedge Fund fallout just getting started?

Nouriel Roubini, not too long ago considered an alarmist by many, has been so right (while so many were wrong) that his missives are quickly becoming must reads by anyone even tangentially involved in the capital markets.

In today's Financial Times, Roubini discusses what he sees as the "next step" [free registration required] in the global unraveling of the "shadow banking system":

...The next stage will be a run on thousands of highly leveraged hedge funds. After a brief lock-up period, investors in such funds can redeem their investments on a quarterly basis; thus a bank-like run on hedge funds is highly possible. Hundreds of smaller, younger funds that have taken excessive risks with high leverage and are poorly managed may collapse. A massive shake-out of the bloated hedge fund industry is likely in the next two years.

A Global Process of Deleveraging

Easy money. At the heart of our current financial crisis is a systemic disregard for risk which in turn fueled an asinine bubble in worldwide liquidity. The availability of easy money stemmed every rung of the economic ladder. Consumers got easy car loans, homeowners got easy mortgages, corporations fueled M&A and buybacks with easy debt, MEW was plentiful, historic LBOs, unprecedented money growth in emerging and developed sovereign nations. You name it, the liquidity was there. The notion of "what goes up must come down" is more than a truism in this case. While we're beginning to understand the significance of the mess we've collectively made, anyone that thinks the Paulson Plan magically gets us through the normalization process needs to revisit their statistics textbooks from university.

Felix Zulauf explained the situation succinctly in this week's Barron's [sub required]:

The leveraging-up in this cycle is reversing, and we are now deleveraging. When a huge system -- that is, the global credit system dominated by the investment-bank giants that have been the major creators of credit in the last cycle -- turns down, the fallout is going to be terrible. Deleveraging is a very painful process, and will run longer and deeper than anybody can imagine.

Quantifying Hedge Fund Leverage

The hedge fund industry has grown up during the liquidity bubble. That's no coincidence. I've had a number of people ask me what the "typical" leverage profile is within the industry. A recent study by the ECB puts the average hedge fund leverage at 1.4x-1.5x in its most recent analysis; with the caveat that leverage was declining in the face of tighter credit conditions. Unfortunately, even if this number proved accurate, knowing the Mean for our industry isn't very helpful in estimating the potential fallout that Roubini predicts.

  1. Hedge funds are fluid instruments and a snapshot is just that, a snapshot. Industry leverage can change dramatically in a matter of weeks. Quarter to quarter is anyone's guess
  2. The mean isn't predictive given the dispersion of styles and risk characteristics within our industry. There are funds that use little to no leverage, and there are firms that use 10-12x leverage [think Bear Stearns Enhanced Leverage Fund]
  3. The majority of funds are unregistered and unregulated, creating an opacity of disclosure

But Wait, There's More...

1.5x leverage doesn't seem as bad as you thought, right? Well that only accounts for a component of the unwinding Roubini is hinting at. A good chunk of hedge fund capital comes from fund of funds; which use leverage to generate their returns. Still not enough for you? Then remember that lots of hedge funds used that capital to invest in highly leveraged debt instruments (i.e., CDOs).

Way back in January 2007, Gillian Tett of the Financial Times [sub required] relayed a story from an anonymous emailer who expressed disbelief at the ease by which hedge funds have been able to lever up as much at 50:1 [admittedly an extreme example]:

He then relates the case of a typical hedge fund, two times levered. That looks modest until you realise it is partly backed by fund of funds' money (which is three times levered) and investing in deeply subordinated tranches of collateralised debt obligations, which are nine times levered. "Thus every €1m of CDO bonds [acquired] is effectively supported by less than €20,000 of end investors' capital - a 2% price decline in the CDO paper wipes out the capital supporting it.

"The degree of leverage at work . . . is quite frankly frightening," he concludes. "Very few hedge funds I talk to have got a prayer in the next downturn. Even more worryingly, most of them don't even expect one."

Don't Cry for Me Argentina

Right now the "Main Street vs. Wall Street" sentiment is at a fever pitch and, for as little sympathy the average citzen has for the travails of Lehman, AIG, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, et al...you can be sure they have less sympathy for the hedge fund industry. We're big boys (and girls) and the rational among us can't reasonably expect the kind of blank check bail outs being afforded the investment banks, insurers and traditional lenders.

  • Unregulated = Unprotected -- The pound of flesh the government is demanding for this monster bail out is HEAVY REGULATION; and as an industry we've fought continuously against oversight. Ironically, if the HF fallout is severe enough, we're probably facing increased regulation when all is said and done anyway.
  • Easy Political Targets -- The blame game is already underway. While I personally think it's counter productive to spend cycles figuring out who to blame [especially b/c just about everyone is culpable in a mess of this magnitude], it's an ELECTION YEAR and politicians need someone to rally against. Since they can't blame over-leveraged consumers [they need those votes] and assuredly won't blame themselves [how can they win re-election that way?], hedge funds are an easy target.
  • Short-selling criticism is a harbinger -- I've already said my piece on the silliness of the short-selling ban; but that isn't stopping the politicians from beating the "short selling = evil" drum.

Drowning in High Water

Deleveraging and public criticism are just two of the issues at play right now. The proverbial other shoe to drop is the incentive allocation model. For those who aren't familiar with how hedge funds are structured, typically we collect a management fee (based on a percentage of assets under management) and a performance fee (based on a defined percentage of the net profits during a given fiscal period). But what happens when a fund manager fails to generate a positive return? We're subject to a high water mark:

EurekaHedge FAQ:
What is a high water mark?

Where a hedge fund applies a high water mark to an investor's money, this means that the manager will only receive performance fees, on that particular pool of invested money, when its value is greater than its previous greatest value. Should the investment drop in value then the manager must bring it back above the previous greatest value before they can receive performance fees again.

In other words, if a fund loses 10% in Year N, it has to make back that 10% in Year N+1 before it can begin accruing performance fees.

Nine of out Ten Hedge Funds are Under Water

According to a recent survey by EurekaHedge, 97% of the 4,000 funds it surveyed were under their high water mark as of July 31st. That shouldn't be a surprise given where the equity indices currently sit, but it does raise the question of what the resulting impact will be. Barring a major turnaround in the capital markets between now and year end, the majority of the world's hedge funds won't receive performance fees.

Thoughts on the potential fallout:

  • Large, multi-strategy mega funds will weather the storm better than most -- The mega funds are diversified and well capitalized to weather a down year or two. Presuming the aggrerate returns aren't significantly below the high water mark, the potential to quickly get back above water in 2009 will be incentive. Furthermore, top performers at smaller funds will likely look upon the relative safety of working for a mega firm in a new light
  • Hundreds, if not thousands of funds will shut down, merge or recapitalize -- Some fund managers will simply close their doors and move onto other initiatives; returning capital to LPs and living off their past proceeds. Others will look to "get big quickly." Expect many funds that fall significantly under water to lose top performers who would have otherwise generated performance fees on their own portion of the portfolio
  • Capital raising will become more difficult -- This is already happening but capital raising will become more difficult; particularly as fund of funds and large institutions struggle to justify past investments in toxic CDOs and other leveraged, non-performing assets
  • Investors will demand more transparency -- This is self explanatory, and inevitable
  • Aggregate returns will moderate -- Systemic deleveraging means more muted aggregate returns. For funds that have made their way using little to no leverage [full disclosure: we are one of those entities], this hopefully brings opportunity

Tumultuous times are ahead, for every portion of the financial world. Roubini's prediction that hedge funds have a period of rationalization ahead is both logical and highly likely. There will be pain; much of it necessary. But those who stay focused on the task at hand, execute within their stated investment parameters, and balance the need for absolute returns with the need to service and protect their partners against undue risk will not only survive, but flourish. Changes are inevitable, but I for one don't necessarily think that's a bad thing -- longer term, of course.

Disclaimer: The content on this site is provided as general information only and should not be taken as investment advice. Content should not serve in any way as a recommendation to buy or sell any security or financial instrument, or to participate in any particular trading or investment strategy. The ideas expressed on this site are solely the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the opinions of firms affiliated with the author. Any action taken as a result of information or analysis on this blog is ultimately your responsibility. Consult your investment adviser before making any investment decisions.

September 23, 2008 in Bail Out, Finance, Hedge Fund, Investing, Splurge | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Visualization of the "Bail Out"

Samrally_2

September 22, 2008 in Bail Out, Humor, Investing, Splurge | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

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